In the article, "On 'Embodied Knowing' — the Implications of Moral Knowledge in the Confucian Tradition," Tu Wei-Ming (杜維明), a contemporary Confucian scholar, argues that moral reasoning in the Confucian tradition is a kind of "embodied knowing" (體知, tizhi) . 1
Basically, Tu also rejects the use of the scientific method in the investigation of humanity. Following Zhang Zai (張載), the Neo-Confucian philosopher, Tu emphasizes the distinction between moral knowledge (德性之知, dexing zhizhi) and empirical knowledge (聞見之知, wenjian zhizhi) . While empirical knowledge derives ideas or information from observation through our sense organs, it is not necessarily embodied in one's body. However, moral knowledge is not derived from empirical observation. While it cannot be totally separated from empirical knowledge, moral knowledge is a kind of bodily experience; it must be based on reflection of one's bodily practice and experience.
Moral knowledge is a kind of bodily experiential knowledge (體驗, tiyan) . Tu uses a Chinese idiom as a metaphor: "only the person who drinks knows whether water is hot or cold." 2 It is similar to the English idiom, "only the wearer knows where the shoes pain." Ontologically speaking, the expression of the moral subject is necessarily true and honest. Such a claim is a priori , rather than a posteriori . However, from the practical perspective, if we don't maintain the practice of self-cultivation, the moral knowledge of the subject would finally be depleted.
Hong Kong's moral education mainly focuses on conceptual reflection. The practice of self-cultivation has been largely neglected. The retrieval of Confucian Tradition by Tu has rightly reminded us the significance of some extra-curricular activities in students' moral formation.
Footnote:
1 Tu, Wei-Ming (杜維明), "On 'Embodied Knowing' — the Implications of Moral Knowledge in the Confucian Tradition" (論儒家的「體知」-- 德性之知的涵意) (Chinese Article), in Essays from the seminar on Confucian ethics (《儒家倫理研討會論文集》), Liu Shu-hsien, ed. (Singapore: Institute of East Asia Philosophy, 1987), pp. 98-111.
2 Tu, "On Embodied Knowing", p. 101.